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Abstract 21 
Sheep pox and goat pox (SPGP) virus and lumpy skin disease (LSD) virus belong to the 22 
genus Capripoxvirus and cause disease with economic impacts in sheep/goats and cattle 23 
respectively. In 2013/14, outbreaks of SPGP were reported in sheep in Greece and Bulgaria 24 
and LSD outbreaks were reported in cattle in Turkey, Egypt and some countries in the Middle 25 
East. Clinical signs for both diseases include pox lesions, papules and scabs on the skin 26 
which may contain virus. This, together with the fact that Great Britain (GB) currently 27 
imports cattle hides, sheep skins and wool from European Union (EU) countries without the 28 
requirement for treatment prior to export, raises concern that capripoxviruses could be 29 
introduced into GB. A qualitative assessment presented here concluded that the current risk 30 
of entry of SPGP virus into GB through the importation of one untreated sheep skin, hide or 31 
wool bale from an EU Member State (MS) with similar flock prevalence to that in sheep in 32 
Greece in 2013/14 is low. In terms of SPGP virus levels, those infected sheep skins/hides 33 
entering GB are more likely to be from infected animals with normal skin (i.e., not showing 34 
lesions) and hence carrying lower levels of virus than those from animals showing papules 35 
and scabs which contain very high virus levels and are easier to detect. The predicted risk of 36 
importation of LSD virus per cattle hide/skin is also low (assuming LSD were to emerge in an 37 
EU MS with similar herd prevalence to that reported for SPGP in Greece in 2013/14). The 38 
levels of LSD YLUXVRQDQLQIHFWHGFRZ¶VKLGH, if imported, may be very low. It is 39 
recommended that the risks for entry of capripoxviruses are recalculated if outbreaks occur 40 
elsewhere within the EU. 41 
3 
 
Introduction 42 
Lumpy skin disease (LSD), sheep pox and goat pox are pox diseases of cattle, sheep and 43 
goats, respectively. They are characterised by fever, nodules on the skin, internal lesions, 44 
enlarged lymph nodes and sometimes death [1,2,3,4]. The diseases are of economic 45 
importance as they cause damage to hides and can result in death due to secondary bacterial 46 
infections [2] together with resulting disruption of trade in livestock and livestock products 47 
[1]. LSD can cause a temporary reduction in milk production in cattle and sterility in bulls [2] 48 
with subsequent production impacts. The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) has 49 
categorised LSD and sheep pox and goat pox as notifiable diseases [4,5]. 50 
 51 
OIE consider sheep pox and goat pox to be a single disease entity [5],  referred to here as 52 
sheep pox and goat pox (SPGP). The viruses causing these diseases are members of the 53 
Capripoxvirus genus of pox viruses (family Poxviridae) and are clinically indistinguishable. 54 
Strains of sheep pox virus (SPPV), goat pox virus (GTPV) and lumpy skin disease virus 55 
(LSDV) cannot be differentiated serologically [5]. There is close genetic relatedness of 56 
capripoxvirus isolates, which average no less than 96% nucleotide identity between strains of 57 
SPPV, GTPV and LSDV [1]. 58 
LSD is currently present throughout most of the continent of Africa, with only Libya, 59 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in the north still considered free [4]. It has spread out of the 60 
African continent into the Middle East with the first cases in Israel in 1989 after the disease 61 
appeared in Egypt the previous year [4]. LSD outbreaks have been reported in the Middle 62 
Eastern region since 1990 including Kuwait, Lebanon, UAE, Israel and Oman. Tuppurainen 63 
and Oura [4] write that there are no geographical or epidemiological reasons why LSD cannot 64 
spread further north into Turkey and Europe, or further east into Asia and they cite the impact 65 
of climate change on the abundance and distribution of mechanical vector populations as 66 
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possible reasons for this. Indeed, outbreaks of LSD occurred in south eastern Turkey in 67 
2013/14 [6]. 68 
SPGP is found in Africa north of the equator, the Middle East and Asia including India, 69 
Nepal and parts of China [5]. It has spread into Europe on several occasions [5], with 70 
outbreaks reported in sheep in Bulgaria and Greece in 2013/14 [7]. Distinct host preferences 71 
exist with most strains of SPPV and GTPV causing more severe disease in the homologous 72 
host [1] and new introductions are generally only identified in one of the two animal species 73 
concerned (i.e. goats or sheep) depending on the strain introduced [5]. For example, goat pox 74 
was introduced into Bangladesh in 1984 from India, and sheep pox has caused occasional 75 
outbreaks in Italy (1983), Greece (1988, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 2000) and Bulgaria 76 
(1995 and 1996) having spread from Turkey, probably in illegally imported animals [5]. 77 
Spread of capripoxviruses can occur through trade of infected animals and their products 78 
such as wool and hides [8]. Such products may be treated or untreated. Untreated hides and 79 
skins are defined in Regulation (EU) No 142/2011 [9] as cutaneous and subcutaneous tissues 80 
that have not undergone any treatment, other than cutting, chilling or freezing. There is 81 
currently no requirement for treatment of these products imported to GB from within the EU. 82 
Under Regulation (EU) No 142/2011 [9] fresh hides and skins must, however, comply with 83 
the animal health conditions for fresh meat laid down under Council Directive 2002/99/EC 84 
[10]. Thus, skins and hides must not come from slaughterhouses in which animals infected 85 
with sheep pox and goat pox virus (SPGPV) or LSDV were present during the slaughtering 86 
or production process. This is important because it means that if a positive animal is detected 87 
at the farm or slaughterhouse in the EU then the whole batch (including other infected 88 
animals which may have been missed) is condemned. 89 
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Given the ongoing outbreaks of SPGP in south-eastern Europe and LSD in Turkey, there is 90 
potential for further spread of these capripoxviruses to and/or within Europe. This, together 91 
with the fact that GB currently imports cattle hides, sheep skins and wool from European 92 
countries without the requirement for treatment prior to export, raises concern that 93 
capripoxviruses could be introduced into GB. This paper describes a qualitative assessment 94 
of the risk of importation of one infected product (i.e. skin/hide or bale of wool) through legal 95 
trade into GB.  96 
 97 
Methods 98 
Risk question and scope 99 
The specific risk question was: What is the probability that an individual whole skin/hide or 100 
bale of wool legally imported from an EU Member State (MS) with an ongoing outbreak is 101 
infected with capripoxvirus at the point of entry into GB? Thus, following the OIE Terrestrial 102 
Animal Health Code definition [11], an entry assessment was undertaken. SPGPV and LSDV 103 
are very similar and each step of the risk assessment considers both viruses together, while 104 
highlighting any subtle differences that warrant a separate consideration in terms of risk. The 105 
products (skins/hide/wool) are considered collectively. Trade levels to GB and 106 
transmission/spread, once within GB, were not considered. An infected product was defined 107 
as one that contains one or more infectious virus particles. 108 
Risk pathway 109 
The risk pathway has four component steps: (i) the herd/flock from which an animal comes is 110 
infected (with probability P1), (ii) an individual animal is infected with the virus (with 111 
probability P2), given the herd/flock is infected, (iii) the infected skin/hide/wool bale enters 112 
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the export chain (with probability P3), and (iv) the virus survives packaging and transport of 113 
the skin/hide/wool to GB (with probability P4). The probabilities P2, P3 and P4 are 114 
conditional probabilities and the overall probability of virus entry (R) is given by: 115 
R=P1P2P3P4                                                               (1) 116 
Although the level of virus is not explicitly considered as an output from the assessment 117 
(virus entry is defined as one or more infectious virus particles), it is important for the 118 
estimation of some of the pathway probabilities. In particular P3 and P4 are dependent on the 119 
levels of the virus in the skin of infected animals. For this reason, virus level was considered.  120 
 121 
Levels of virus on skins/hides of infected animals 122 
A distinction was made between skins/hides from infected animals showing clinical signs 123 
(i.e. pox lesions, papules or scabs) and those from infected animals with normal skin (i.e., 124 
skin with no apparent gross pathology) and no clinical signs. This distinction was made 125 
because most virus is found in the skin papules about six days after their first appearance [5]. 126 
Bowden et al [1] estimated that the normal skin of goats experimentally infected with GTPV 127 
has 103.0 to 104.4  tissue culture infectious dose 50% (TCID50) per gram between 8 and 13 days 128 
post inoculation (dpi) while the papules have loading ranges over 100-fold higher than the 129 
normal skin at 105.2 to >107.2  TCID50 per gram over the same time scale. Similarly, genomic 130 
copies of SPPV in normal sheep skin were 4-log10 (per 100 ng total DNA) at 8 dpi compared 131 
to 6.5-log10 for the secondary skin nodules [1]  with a >5 log10 difference at 13 dpi. In 132 
experimentally infected sheep, SPPV titres of 107 TCID50 per gram of skin (at sites where 133 
virus was inoculated) were detected by day 7 to 8 [12]. In cattle experimentally infected with 134 
LSDV through the jugular vein, skin nodules contained high levels of virus [13] with 5.1 and 135 
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5.3 log10 plaque forming units (pfu) per gram at 12 and 15 dpi, respectively [13]. In contrast 136 
to sheep and goats in the study of Bowden et al [1], infectious virus was absent from normal 137 
skin of LSDV-infected cattle [13]. Furthermore, while levels of viral DNA in the skin 138 
nodules of cattle were very high between 4.6 and 8.6 log10 copies per Pg tissue, levels of viral 139 
DNA in normal skin of LSDV-infected cattle were in general undetectable [13]. Based on 140 
these data, it was assumed that the titre of virus on a hide/skin is directly proportional to the 141 
number of lesions or papules on that hide/skin and the time since infection. The papules and 142 
scabs are likely to contain very high levels of virus, while normal skin from SPGPV-infected 143 
goats and sheep is likely to contain medium levels of virus. Normal skin from LSDV-infected 144 
cattle contains very low levels of virus. 145 
 146 
Levels of virus in wool from infected animals 147 
There is little information on levels of SPPV or GPPV in wool. Following experimental 148 
intradermal inoculation, the virus replicates in the cells of the dermis and glandular hair cells 149 
at the base of the hair follicles [15]. Unlike skin, the virus will not be able to replicate within 150 
the wool itself, and therefore any virus present will be due to contamination of the wool with 151 
skin fragments, including fragments of scab material. In this respect the wool could contain 152 
fragments of lesion with high loadings of virus. The papules may cover the whole body or be 153 
restricted to the more hairless or woolless parts of the skin [1,5]. In lambs and kids naturally 154 
infected in the Duhok area of Iraq, the presence of pox lesions occurs in areas of the hide 155 
with less wool and hair [14]. Similarly in sheep in Iran, the gross lesions in adults occurred in 156 
woolless or sparsely wooled areas of skin [15]. However, the gross lesions were all over the 157 
skin and in some internal organs in lambs [15]. It was assumed that wool from infected adult 158 
sheep contains low levels of infectivity while wool from lambs contains medium levels of 159 
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infectivity. This reflects the fact that in some lambs lesions occur all over the skin rather than 160 
in the woolless areas observed in adults. 161 
 162 
Qualitative probabilities 163 
The entry assessment describes the probability of entry of the virus into GB through the 164 
importation of one product item from other regions of the EU. Following the European Food 165 
Safety Authority (EFSA) definitions, the probabilities in Equation (1) are expressed 166 
qualitatively as negligible, very low, low, medium, high or very high [16,17]. The definitions 167 
of these terms were taken from [16] namely, negligible: so rare that it does not merit to be 168 
considered; very low:  very rare but cannot be excluded; low: event is rare but does occur; 169 
medium: event occurs regularly; high: event occurs very often; and very high: event occurs 170 
almost certainly.  To estimate the risk of release, R, the qualitative probabilities were 171 
combined as in Equation (1) using the reasoning described previously [18]. In summary, as 172 
each qualitative probability P1 to P4 can be considered quantitatively as taking a value 173 
between 0 and 1, it follows that the product R will be at most, the minimum of P1 to P4. The 174 
qualitative value of R is thus set as the minimum of the qualitative values of P1 to P4.  The 175 
probability definitions given above apply to all the qualitative probabilities within the risk 176 
assessment, i.e. R, P1, P2, P3 and P4. 177 
 178 
Estimation of P1: Probability that a herd/flock is infected 179 
Data on the recent outbreaks in Greece were used to estimate P1. Hadjigeorgiou et al [19] 180 
reported that there are around 9,200,000 sheep and 5,600,000 goats in Greece on about 181 
300,000 farm units. Counting the units with more than 10 adult female animals, this equates 182 
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to about 155,000 farms. OIE [7] give data on the number of farm units in which outbreaks 183 
occur. Between Aug 2013 and January 2014 (six months), outbreaks of SPGPV were 184 
reported in sheep in Greece in 82 farm units [7]. Over a period of one year, therefore, double 185 
that number of outbreaks, i.e. 164, might be expected. This would represent about one in a 186 
thousand of the 155,000 goat and sheep farms in Greece. LSDV has never been reported in 187 
Europe [4], and it is assumed here P1 would be similar to that for SPPV in Greece. 188 
Estimation of P2: Probability that an individual animal within a positive herd/flock is 189 
infected 190 
Data from the recent outbreaks of SPGPV in sheep in Greece and Bulgaria were used to 191 
estimate this probability. Between Aug 2013 and January 2014, a total of 1,472 cases (250 192 
deaths) of SPGPV were reported in Greece in 17,735 susceptible sheep in 82 infected flocks 193 
(Figure 1) [7]. 7KH2,(GHILQLWLRQ>@RIVXVFHSWLEOHDQLPDOVLV³$QLPDOVSUHVHQWLQWKH194 
oXWEUHDNVDWWKHVWDUWRIWKHSHULRGLQTXHVWLRQ´7KXVWKHQXPEHURIVXVFHSWLEOHDQLPDOV195 
recorded by OIE [6, 7] includes all animals on the farm which are susceptible to the virus 196 
whether infected or not. Therefore the average within-flock prevalence in sheep may be 197 
calculated as 1,472/17,735 = 0.083. The range of within-flock prevalences was from 0.0035 198 
(1 case in 284 susceptible sheep) to 1.0 (13 cases in 13 susceptible sheep) with 5th and 95th 199 
percentiles of 0.007 and 0.552 respectively.  Linear regression analysis of the data for 82 200 
infected sheep flocks in Greece [7] showed that there is a statistically significant relationship 201 
between decreasing within-herd prevalence and increasing herd size, (P<0.001) (Figure 1).  202 
There is uncertainty associated with why this relationship could occur, but one possibility is 203 
that this represents an under-reporting in larger flocks because once a single case is detected 204 
the whole flock is condemned, and there is little point in looking for every last case in a large 205 
flock.     206 
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In Bulgaria there were three outbreaks in 2013 [7], with a total of 37 cases in 558 susceptible 207 
sheep giving an average within-flock prevalence of 0.066. The reported outbreaks from 208 
Greece and Bulgaria give estimates of the mean within-flock prevalence (P2) to be between 209 
0.066 and 0.083. Pox lesions, however, may be missed due to their restricted distribution on 210 
some sheep [8]. Thus, the true within-flock prevalence may be higher than these values. In 211 
terms of disease symptoms between individual animals, SPGPV typically exhibits a uniform 212 
range of responses in the respective host species [8] such that infected animals typically show 213 
symptoms. However in the case of cattle, not all animals infected with LSDV exhibit clinical 214 
signs thus potentially hindering detection of cases on farm. In 21 outbreaks in Turkey 215 
between Nov 2013 and Feb 2014 [6], 837 LSD cases were reported in 21,829 susceptible 216 
cattle giving an average within-herd prevalence of 0.038 and roughly half that of SPGP 217 
reported in sheep in Greece and Bulgaria. According to Tuppurainen and Oura [4], only 50% 218 
of LSDV-infected cows are likely to show clinical signs, even though the majority of 219 
experimentally infected cows become viraemic. The observed within-herd prevalence of 220 
LSDV was therefore multiplied by factor of two for the purpose of this risk assessment. Thus 221 
the estimated within-herd prevalence for a LSDV-positive herd in Turkey is around 0.076 and 222 
comparable to that reported for SPGPV-positive sheep flocks in Greece and Bulgaria. The 223 
range of within-flock prevalences for LSDV-positive herds in Turkey was from 0.0007 (1 224 
case in 1,372 susceptible cattle) to 0.67 (2 cases in 3 susceptible cattle). Linear regression 225 
analysis of the data for 21 LSDV-infected cattle herds in Turkey between Nov 2013 and Feb 226 
2014 [6] showed that there is a statistically significant relationship between decreasing 227 
within-herd prevalence and increasing herd size, (P=0.002) (data not shown). 228 
 229 
Estimation of P3: Probability that infected skin/hide/wool bale enters the export chain 230 
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The probability P3 relates to the detection of an infected animal and therefore whether the infected 231 
hide is prevented from being exported, rather than whether the animal was slaughtered for domestic 232 
consumption or export. With reference to the risk question (see above) it is given that the hide has 233 
been legally imported into GB and therefore comes from an EU farm registered to export where EU 234 
142/2011 is enforced. The probability P3 depends on the probability that an individual infected 235 
animal/skin is not detected either on the farm or at the approved slaughter house. In the 82 236 
reported outbreaks of SPGPV in sheep in Greece between Aug 2013 and Jan 2014, flocks 237 
with as few as one case in 284 susceptible sheep were reported [7]. This suggests that some 238 
farmers/slaughter house operators are good at spotting low frequency occurrences of clinical 239 
cases in a large number of animals although it is not known how many cases were present in 240 
that flock of 284 sheep and were thus missed. It would seem unlikely that the remaining 283 241 
susceptible sheep in that flock were tested to confirm they were negative. However, at the 242 
other extreme, 270 cases were reported in a flock of 390 susceptible sheep, suggesting that 243 
the probability of detecting an infected animal with clinical symptoms is relatively high. To 244 
estimate P3 it was assumed that the probability of detection of an infected animal at an 245 
approved slaughter house or on a farm is directly proportional to the number of lesions on 246 
that animal (i.e. the more papules the greater the chance that the farmer or slaughterhouse 247 
worker will see one). Therefore, those animals with high titre hides/skin/wool have a high 248 
probability of being detected, while the lower titre animal hides from infected animals 249 
without lesions are more likely to be missed. For SPGPV, the distribution of pox lesions in 250 
the skin can be widespread with over 50% of the skin surface affected [8] facilitating 251 
detection of cases. However, more commonly in enzootic areas, the lesions in sheep and 252 
goats are restricted to a few nodules under the tail and are thus only detected on close 253 
examination [8], increasing the probability of not detecting a case. Furthermore some animals 254 
in the slaughterhouse may be at a stage where infection has taken place in the skin but 255 
clinical symptoms have not yet developed. Thus, virus was detected in normal skin of sheep 256 
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at 4 dpi [1] while macules did not develop before 5 dpi. Moreover the number of SPGP viral 257 
genomic copies was ~4-log10 in normal skin in sheep at 6 dpi when macules faded on 258 
exsanguination prior to necropsy [1]. Thus macule detection efficiency could be reduced at 259 
slaughterhouses, while significant levels of virus are present in normal skin and in the 260 
macules themselves. The macules enlarge and develop into papules within 1 to 2 days and 261 
then to scabs within the following week [1]. Papules and scabs are less likely to be missed. 262 
For LSDV-infected cattle, only half of those infected show symptoms (discussed above). 263 
The probability P3 is also related to the number of clinical cases in the flock/herd on the farm 264 
or in the slaughterhouse batch (which could include more than one flock or herd). Thus the 265 
more clinical cases in an infected flock/batch, the greater the chance that at least one is 266 
detected and that all animals in that flock/batch and thus their products are condemned 267 
according to EU 142/2011. Analysis of the outbreak data for SPGPV in sheep in Greece [7] 268 
showed that the statistical distribution for the number of cases per infected flock is skewed 269 
with a significant proportion of infected flocks having a few cases and a small proportion 270 
having a large number of cases (Figure 2). Thus, although the average was 18.0 cases per 271 
infected flock (1,472 cases in 82 flocks), some 33% of infected flocks had just 1, 2 or 3 cases. 272 
The statistical distribution of the number of LSDV cases in infected cattle herds (Figure 2) is 273 
even more skewed than for SPGPV based on the data for 21 LSDV outbreaks in Turkey 274 
between Nov 2013 and Feb 2014 [6]. Thus of 21 infected herds, 14 (66%) has just one or two 275 
cases while three herds had >200 cases. 276 
About 110 fleeces may go into a bale of wool [20]. The shearing process on the farm may 277 
expose skin lesions and allow detection of infected animals at an earlier stage. However, 278 
although many animals contribute wool to a bale, many infected sheep flocks have few cases 279 
of SPGPV (Figure 2). 280 
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Estimation of P4: Virus on wool/hide/skin survives transport to GB. 281 
Although SPGPV is very susceptible to direct sunlight, it can persist for months in dark 282 
conditions, such as contaminated animal sheds [5] and has been shown to remain infectious 283 
for periods of at least 3 months in scab material obtained from animals which have recovered 284 
from the infection [21] LSDV is stable between pH 6.6 and 8.6 and showed no significant 285 
reduction in titre after 5 days at 37qC over this pH range [22]. For LSDV in the skin lesions 286 
of infected animals, the virus can persist for at least 33 days even though the necrotic portions 287 
of skin have completely dried out [22]. Skin/hides and wool are likely to be transported to 288 
GB via trucks and ships. Various travel blogs report that the drive from Greece to England 289 
requires 4 - 7 days. With temperatures below 37qC and in the dark, it was assumed that little 290 
or no inactivation of the virus would occur during this time for transport.  291 
 292 
Results 293 
On the basis of 2013/14 data for Greece and taking into account the number of sheep/goat 294 
farms in Greece, it was concluded that the probability, P1, that a herd or flock is infected, is 295 
low.  296 
Assuming that the data for SPGP in Greece and Bulgaria [7] and LSD in Turkey [6] give a 297 
reasonable description of within-flock prevalence for capripoxviruses in any EU country 298 
which could potentially have outbreaks or undisclosed infection, it was concluded that  P2 is 299 
mostly medium.  It is noted that smaller flocks appear to have higher within-flock prevalences 300 
(Figure 1) (1.0 in two flocks). Thus on a flock to flock bases, P2 may vary between medium 301 
and very high. 302 
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As described previously a SPGPV-infected sheep could be missed because the macules may 303 
be localised to areas where they are hidden such as under the tail and a LSDV-infected cow 304 
could be missed because it is not showing clinical symptoms. Taking this into account 305 
together with the evidence above that virus could be present in skin before macules have 306 
developed, the probability of not detecting an SPGPV/LSDV-infected animal is judged to be 307 
medium. This is at the level of the individual animal. For those flocks/herds with a large 308 
number of cases, P3 was considered to be negligible (because at least one case would be 309 
detected resulting in condemnation of the whole flock/batch before it could enter the export 310 
chain) while for those flocks/herds with lower numbers of cases, P3 was considered medium 311 
(reflecting the chance of missing a single case). Since a significant proportion of SPGPV-312 
infected sheep flocks and the major proportion of LSDV-infected cattle herds have only 1, 2 313 
or 3 cases (Figure 2), it was concluded that overall, P3 is medium. This represents a worst 314 
case scenario. Although a batch at a slaughterhouse may include more than one flock, it is 315 
very unlikely that more than one flock would be positive in a given daily batch because the 316 
between-flock prevalence (P1) is low. Thus even those batches at slaughterhouses comprising 317 
multiple flocks/herds are still likely to have only a few cases based on Figure 2. 318 
Given that the SPGP/LSD virus in a hide/skin is unlikely to undergo significant decay within 319 
the travel time to GB together with the medium initial titres of virus in normal skin of 320 
infected sheep and goats, it was concluded that the probability of virus survival, P4, is high. 321 
The individual probabilities and the overall probability R are given in Table 1. The lowest 322 
probability is for P1 (low). Thus by combining the qualitative probabilities in Table 1, using 323 
the method described by Gale et al [18], it was estimated that the overall probability, R, is 324 
low. This represents the probability that an individual raw hide/skin or bale of wool is 325 
infected with SPGP/LSD virus on legal import to GB from an EU MS with ongoing 326 
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outbreaks with similar between-flock (P1) and within-flock (P2) prevalences to those reported 327 
for sheep in Greece in 2013/14. 328 
Descriptions of uncertainty and key assumptions are also presented in Table 1 for each 329 
probability term.  This process identifies that the risk assessment is highly dependent on the 330 
data available from the SPGP outbreak in Greece and there is therefore uncertainty associated 331 
with the estimate of risk of another EU country having an outbreak.  It is therefore 332 
recommended that this risk assessment is revisited if outbreaks occur elsewhere so that the 333 
estimates for P1, P2 and P3 and hence the overall estimate of risk can be verified.   334 
 335 
Discussion 336 
Outbreaks of SPGP have been reported in sheep in Greece and Bulgaria in 2013/14. LSD 337 
outbreaks have occurred in cattle in south-eastern Turkey and there is no reason to assume 338 
that LSDV will not spread into Europe at some stage [4]. Given this situation, there is 339 
concern within GB that capripoxviruses could be imported via the legal trade of skins/hides 340 
and wool from the EU. Using data from the 2013/14 outbreaks of SPGP in Greece and 341 
Bulgaria and LSD in Turkey, together with microbiological data from the literature, a 342 
qualitative entry assessment was undertaken. It was estimated that the probability of entry of 343 
SPGPV/LSDV in a single hide/skin/wool bale imported from a MS with ongoing outbreaks is 344 
currently low. Entry of infection was defined in terms of importation of one infected product 345 
(skin, hide or bale of wool), contaminated with one or more infectious virus particles. 346 
Although there are quantitative data available for many of the parameters including P1, P2 and P4, a 347 
qualitative approach was adopted here because of the lack of any quantitative data for estimation of 348 
P3. 349 
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Viral load was considered to some extent within the assessment although it was not explicitly 350 
stated in the probability of entry. While normal skin of SPGPV-infected sheep and goats does 351 
contain infectivity, the titres are very much lower than for those in papules and nodules. In 352 
view of the inspection processes at approved slaughterhouses, it is considered here that any 353 
imported product infected with the virus would most likely have come from an infected 354 
animal not yet displaying clinical signs. Alternatively the hide/skin material imported may 355 
exclude those regions of the skin (woolless areas or under the tail) where nodules more 356 
commonly occur [8]. The viral load on the hide/skin of such an animal is likely to be at a 357 
medium level rather than the very high levels found in skins with lesions and papules. The 358 
viral levels in wool from an infected bale would also be medium although there may be some 359 
variation depending on whether the wool is from lambs or adult sheep. Whether or not this 360 
medium level would be important for transmission within GB would depend on several 361 
factors including the dose-response relationship and the potential routes of exposure for GB 362 
cattle, sheep and goats. SPGPV is spread through aerosols and/or close contact and by 363 
indirect means such as contamination of cuts and abrasions (Babiuk et al, 2008a). The high 364 
concentration of virus in the skin may also contribute to spread via insect vectors [1] although 365 
it is not clear whether this could happen from hides/wool in GB. Normal skin of LSDV-366 
infected cows has very low levels of virus [8]. Thus the capripoxvirus levels on an LSDV-367 
infected cattle skin/hide given it has entered GB from the EU may be much lower than that 368 
for SPGPV-infected hides.  369 
The assessment did not consider the volume of trade in skins/hides/wool from the EU. Thus 370 
the probabilities of entry per year or per batch were not estimated. There are currently no data 371 
available to determine the volume of trade. Should these data become available in the future, 372 
the assessment could be extended to include such estimates. 373 
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The method used to combine the qualitative probabilities associated with the risk of entry of 374 
virus makes use of the fact that these probabilities are conditional; they correspond to a 375 
sequential set of events, all of which are necessary for the importation of an infected product. 376 
In a comparable quantitative assessment, the rules of probability mean that the conditional 377 
probabilities are multiplied to give the joint probability which represents the estimate of risk. 378 
The absolute maximum of this joint probability will be the minimum of the conditional 379 
probabilities. It is intuitive to consider the same multiplicative process when dealing with 380 
conditional probabilities that are qualitative. However, in this case, risk may be over-381 
estimated because no account is taken of where on the qualitative category an individual 382 
probability will lie. Furthermore, if all four probabilities P1 to P4 were low, for example, then 383 
R would still be low as it would if three were high and just one were low. Thus, the low 384 
estimate of virus entry may very well be an over-estimate in this case. As it currently stands, 385 
the value of P1 is the determining probability for R as it is the only probability with a value of 386 
low. Thus, based on the current data and assessment, the risk of entry of virus depends on the 387 
herd/flock prevalence in the countries in which there have been recent outbreaks i.e. Greece 388 
and Bulgaria. Should the situation in Greece, Bulgaria or any other EU country change, the 389 
estimate of risk would need to be updated.   390 
Although there is considerable variation in the within-herd prevalence for SPGPV-positive 391 
sheep flocks in Greece (Figure 1) (and for LSDV-positive herds in Turkey (not shown)) this 392 
range could reflect natural variation, for example due to differences in exposure resulting 393 
from the intensity of the sheep/sheep contacts (sheep density), differences in environmental 394 
factors between flocks and differences in the susceptibility of individuals/breeds within a 395 
given flock (i.e. dose-response). There is a statistically significant relationship between 396 
decreasing within-herd prevalence and increasing herd size both for SPGP in sheep in Greece 397 
(Figure 1) and for LSD in cattle in Turkey (not shown). As discussed previously, this may 398 
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relate to some bias within the data due to failure to detect all of the infected animals within a 399 
positive herd, particularly in the larger herds. However, using the approaches described above 400 
for the combining of probabilities, only a significant decrease in the magnitude of P2 (such 401 
that P2 is less than P1) would affect the predicted value of R in this assessment. Under EU 402 
142/2011 all animals in the flock/slaughterhouse batch are condemned if at least one case is 403 
detected. Therefore the probability of an infected skin/hide/wool bale entering the export 404 
chain (P3) is dependent on the statistical distribution of the number of cases within an 405 
infected flock/herd/batch. Thus the more cases in a flock, the greater the chance that at least 406 
one is detected and that the whole flock/slaughter house batch is condemned (under EU 407 
142/2011). An increase in within-herd prevalence or emergence of a more virulent strain 408 
which meant fewer infected flocks had just one or two cases, would greatly decrease P3. 409 
Indeed should P3 decrease in magnitude below low, so too would R. While some 410 
capripoxvirus-infected animals do not show symptoms (see above) and would not be detected 411 
on an individual basis it is unlikely that multiple infected animals in a given flock/herd would 412 
all be symptomless at time of inspection. Thus a high within-herd prevalence not only 413 
increases the probability of at least one case with symptoms being detected, but also increases 414 
the probability of at least some cases displaying detectable symptoms. The statistical 415 
distribution of the number of cases within those infected herds/flocks is therefore central to 416 
understanding the uncertainty in P3. 417 
In conclusion, based on the 2013/14 outbreak data for countries in south-east Europe, the 418 
probability of entry of SPGPV into GB from the importation of a single hide/skin/wool bale 419 
from an EU MS with ongoing outbreaks has been assessed as low. The predicted risk is also 420 
low for LSDV in a single cattle skin/hide should this virus emerge in an EU MS at some 421 
stage. These estimates are sensitive to the herd/flock prevalence during an outbreak in the 422 
EU. 423 
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 495 
 496 
Table 1: Estimated qualitative probabilities for SPGP and LSD. 497 
Probability Qualitative probability Key assumptions and uncertainties 
Herd/flock infected (P1) Low Data only available for SPGP in 
Greece, therefore uncertain of 
probability of a herd/flock being 
infected elsewhere in the EU.  No 
cases of LSD in EU so assumes P1 is 
similar to that for SPGP in sheep in 
Greece and Bulgaria.   
Animal infected, given herd is positive 
(P2) 
Medium to Very High Within-flock prevalence data only 
available for SPGPV in sheep in 
Greece and Bulgaria (and LSDV in 
Turkey), therefore uncertain of the 
value of P2 for outbreaks in other EU 
countries.   
Infected skin enters export chain (P3) Medium Infected animals with fewer lesions 
or earlier stages of infection may be 
missed. P3 tends to negligible for 
herds with many infected animals. 
Virus survival (P4) High None 
Risk of release for one product item 
(R) 
Low Limited or no data available for 
likely prevalence of SPGP and LSD 
within or between flocks/herds in EU 
countries other than Greece and 
Bulgaria.  Therefore considerable 
uncertainty associated with the risk 
of release if an outbreak is reported 
in another country.   
 
 498 
499 
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Figure legends 500 
 501 
Figure 1: The reported within-flock prevalence for cases of SPGPV-infected sheep decreases 502 
with the size of the flock, P = 2.3 x 10-7 (slope -0.217/log10 flock size, 95% c.i. -0.14 to -503 
0.29). Data for 82 SPGPV-infected sheep flocks in Greece between Aug 2013 and Jan 2014 504 
(OIE, 2014b). 505 
 506 
 507 
Figure 2: Distribution of number of detected cases per infected herd for SPGPV outbreaks in 508 
sheep in Greece (OIE, 2014a) and LSDV outbreaks in cattle in Turkey (OIE, 2014b). 509 
 510 
 511 
